No “Distanciation” During Logogenesis

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Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 587):

A text is thus a unit of meaning — more accurately, a unit in the flow of meaning that is always taking place at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

“it’s all semantics”

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i guess i’m remembering the discussions i had with fellow art school inmates way back in the 70’s, but at a certain point in these discussions, someone would always come up with the disclaimer that it was ‘all just semantics’. that is, that the point over which we were arguing was not ‘real’ in any sense, but a matter of how we interpreted the meanings of the words.
nowadays, i might hear some people exclaiming instead that “it’s all semiotics”.

so the other day we attended UNSW’s school of english, media and performing arts’ (EMPA) 2nd “hall conversation” (which however, was held in a small theatre in webster) to hear three colleagues speak to the notion of “affect” as they understood the term within their discipline and research.

we linguists were there in support of peter white of media and who classes himself as a linguist, while the other two speakers were from music and theatre and performance studies. they each gave an account of how they used and viewed the concept in their disciplines, and as i listened, i felt a growing sense of unease about the divide between the treatment of affect as a ‘real’ felt somatic phenomenon of the body/consciousness that could be discussed, and a linguist’s perspective that such feelings do exist but they were beyond the purview of our analysis – or that once someone talked or wrote of such feelings then we could discuss those items of language use…

eventually peter white in his short presentation mentioned this – that is, linguists’ orientation toward the phenomena we study (i.e. language use, the grammar of that use, the meanings in context of that use, etc) as contrasted to what was classed as phenomena for their study.
and then the floor was open to questions and comments.
we already knew that we were vastly out numbered here, and that theatre and performance people, and those who ‘used’ writers such as deleuze in their own work were in the majority in the room. we were aware that the definitions on which they based their work were not of sufficient clarity for us to work with…
so it was no surprise that most of the commentary was directed towards one of their own.
but what we all became particularly interested in (as we discussed later) was more centred on the heat which seemed to be generated over the use of the terms ’emotion’ versus ‘affect’ in descriptions of afferent processes in the brain stem.

it seemed that it was very important (to one attendee in particular) that the word ’emotion’ was not used to refer to those un-labelled feelings that arise before conscious labelling of them, and that ‘affect’ needed to be retained as the term for that, while ’emotion’ should be used for those states which were then classed or labelled with language items.
discussions of the states of ‘arousal’ that babies experience before being socialised into comprehending those states would fall into this sphere of being labelled as ‘affect’ perhaps, but one should refrain from calling these ’emotions’. [something, i remarked to myself, would perhaps ruffle the neuroscientist participants of the mid 90’s conference i followed, who were not chary about labelling these pre-self-conscious states as ’emotion’. this highlighted by the very name their conference had been called: “emotion and consciousness”, its main premiss being that without emotional arousal, consciousness and other social learning in the infant could not be expected to occur.]
examples pertaining to animal consciousness, and dogs in particular, their sense of deference, shame, etc, were also brought up in the course of the hallway conversation the other day…

of course, as appraisal analysts, we use the term ‘affect’ to refer to one class of attitudinal terms that one can find in texts in general (see the appraisal website for details). but the need to carefully distinguish between the terms ‘affect’ and ’emotion’ for this group of researchers who were not linguists, was of paramount importance to (some of) them, and pointed to their need for precision in this area.
it seemed to me that for them, the term ’emotion’ carried with it too much semantic ‘baggage’, and connoted states that were recognised and labelled, as well as given some evaluative status, whereas the term ‘affect’ remained somewhat neutral in this regard. that is, it seemed that the term ‘affect’ did not carry any reference to socially dis/approved responses, but merely denoted a general class of phenomena related to bodily states.
it was this need to distinguish between two terms we had all hitherto not considered of much difference, or at least not seen how it was of significance to those directed towards the discussion of these matters, that excited our interest.

dialect map of USA comes to our attention

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thanks to twitter, followed a link to this most interesting website, maintained as a hobby by someone called Rick Aschmann. he apologises to those whose emails he has not yet answered – the site has generated many more, apparently, since several other websites posted notes and articles about his work on this site…

interesting for the design for a start.
it’s a cornucopia in concept, boxes of this and that all neatly separated according to sub-topic, with heaps of blue underlining which normally signifies links to further information, and small headings in red for notes, dates and so on.

there are links to recordings of speakers, and a map which shows the different dialects of the north american continent, along with related links to audio of representative speakers for that area. as well as calls for more sample recordings of speakers from areas that he has not been able to collect yet…

the dialect map is also available in pdf form so interested parties can print it out.

what more can you ask for?
a MAP plus audio recordings of speakers linked to the map????

ASFLA 2011 call for papers

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click on image to see full size, or click on link to conference site in right sidebar for details –>

Everything Old Is New Again

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The Human Individual: Organism, Person, Meaner

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Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):

The human individual is at once a biological “individual”, a social “individual”, and a socio–semiotic “individual”:

as a biological “individual”, s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social “individual”, s/he is a person, born into a social group as a member of society.  “Person” is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social rôles or personæ entering into social networks …

as a socio–semiotic “individual”, s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community.  Meaner is also a complex construct. …

These different levels of individuality map onto one other: a meaner is a person, and a person is a biological organism.  But the mappings are complex; and at each level an individual lives in different environments — in different networks of relations.

Academic Persona Types?

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Throughout this long deveopment, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.  With this difference, others have been associated.  
The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically.  They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred.  They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.  
The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion.  
This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

 — Bertrand Russell ‘The History Of Western Philosophy’ (pp21-2)

baby’s ontogenetic trajectory recorded

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here’s a TED talk about the recording of deb roy’s baby’s first 90,000 hours of interacting with parents and family. a true multimodal analysis of patterns of interaction qua language development.

… at least they label his activities (he’s from MIT) as “designing machines that learn to communicate in human like ways”

individual/community quotes

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4 thinkers, all men, who at different times have said almost the same things in different ways.

it’s not likely that V read any of the others, although L probably has. R&B, however, definitely did not read any of the other two. V’s was also in translation.
the meta-discursive meanings these guys were making then, were instances of different meaning “systems”, despite their being at another level instances of the same grammatical system, and dare i say, registers (this also despite the differences in orientation: the first uses a personal orientation (1st person), the second a third person orientation (it), and the third uses an inclusive ‘we’ orientation. at the same time, field may be considered similar due to repeated references to ‘individual’, and other lexical items in a sort of meronymic relation to ‘community’ [social, group]).

in view the differences in time of publication, and only one definite ‘cross-pollination’ of cultural (?) meanings, can we consider these quotation fragments as either ‘specimens’ (instruments) or ‘artefacts’ (objects) (in the halliday& matthiessen 2004 sense)? because they are not whole texts, and because they are not the subject of analysis at the grammatical level, perhaps – in this instance of their use – they should not be classed as specimens (of the language as system) – but artefacts…representative pieces of a larger puzzle? that larger puzzle, the way that meaning can be viewed, where it resides, how it comes about, how to think about meaning-making. and in this case, the mediating individual body is not viewed as the receptacle of meaning, rather the locus.

‘in this instance of their use’, the quotations are being used (by me) to highlight similarities in meta-meanings, through instances far removed in time and space. i’m always telling my students to only use quotations to illustrate or support their argument, not to make it for them. so, either i am not making an argument, or i am being hypocritical here and now.

Instead of talking about meaning-making as something that is done by minds, I prefer to talk about it as a social practice in a community. It is a kind of doing that is done in ways that are characteristic of a community, and its occurrence is part of what binds the community together and helps to constitute it as a community. In this sense we can speak of a community, not as a collection of interacting individuals, but as a system of interdependent social practices: a system of doings, rather than a system of doers. These social meaning-making practices are also material processes that bind the community together as a physical ecosystem.

[Lemke 1995: 9-10]

In point of fact, the speech act, or more accurately, its product-the utterance-cannot under any circumstances be considered an individual phenomenon in the precise meaning of the word and cannot be explained in terms of individual psychological or psychophysiological conditions of the speaker. The utterance is a social phenomenon.

[Volosinov 1973: 82]

At the group level, in addition to the verbal and non verbal processes,
present at the interpersonal level, we meet with new types of symbolization not ordinarily regarded as such. The patterns of the organization of the group leave traces in the participating individuals.
However, inasmuch as these individuals do not act as stations of origin or destination of messages, but often as channels only, codification at this level requires intactness in the organization as a whole. The group in action possesses the information, not the individual.

[Ruesch & Bateson 1951: 284]

Tiny bugs have own personalities despite being clones

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Ti­ny green in­sects known as pea aphids have in­di­vid­ual be­hav­ior pat­terns, or “per­sonal­i­ties,” de­spite be­ing clones of one an­oth­er, sci­en­tists say. The re­search­ers found dif­fer­ences in the way each in­di­vid­ual re­sponds to a threat.

The study was part of a “bur­geon­ing” of sci­en­tif­ic in­ter­est in an­i­mal per­son­al­ity varia­t­ion, not­ed the in­ves­ti­ga­tors, with the Uni­vers­ity of Os­nabrueck, Ger­ma­ny. But de­spite this trend, they added, few stud­ies have been done on in­ver­te­brates, or sim­ple an­i­mals with­out back­bones.

The pea aphid, Acyrthosiphon pi­sum, sucks nec­tar from a plant. (Im­age cour­tesy Tsu­to­mu Tsu­ch­ida)


Stud­ies on “clonal in­ver­te­brates,” which are all ge­net­ic­ally iden­ti­cal and would thus be ex­pected to show lim­it­ed dif­fer­ences in be­hav­ior, are “nonex­is­ten­t,” they added, re­port­ing their find­ings in the March 1 on­line is­sue of the jour­nal De­vel­op­men­tal Psy­cho­bi­ol­ogy.

“This is sur­pris­ing giv­en the ob­vi­ous ad­van­tages of us­ing in­ver­te­brates/clones to tack­le the cru­cial ques­tion why such con­sist­ent be­hav­ioral dif­fer­ences ex­ist,” they went on. Per­son­al­ity dif­fer­ences not at­trib­ut­a­ble to genes are gen­er­ally pre­sumed to be due to the en­vi­ron­ment in which an or­gan­ism formed, though there is al­so a grow­ing ap­precia­t­ion of epige­net­ic fac­tors—chem­ical dif­fer­ences that are not ge­net­ic, but that in­flu­ence gene ac­ti­vity.

Pea aphids, sci­entifically named Acyr­tho­si­phon pi­sum, are pale little in­sects ty­pi­cally less than a sixth of an inch (half a cen­ti­me­ter) long that feed on pea plants and their rel­a­tives. A clus­ter of aphids in­fest­ing a giv­en plant is typ­ic­ally a ge­net­ic­ally iden­ti­cal, or clonal, group pro­duced by one moth­er with­out sex, al­though aphids can al­so re­pro­duce sex­u­ally at cer­tain phases.

When a pea aphid is threat­ened by a preda­tor—of which the spe­cies has sev­er­al in­clud­ing wasps and grub­s—it gives off a chem­i­cal alarm sig­nal that alerts near­by aphids. They may re­spond in sev­er­al ways: they can walk away, drop off the plant or seem­ingly ig­nore the sig­nal. The re­search­ers, Wiebke Schuett and col­leagues, found that pea aphids can be di­vid­ed in­to one of three cat­e­gories: con­sist­ent “drop­pers,” con­sist­ent “non-droppers,” and some that be­have un­pre­dict­a­bly.

In ex­pe­ri­ments, “ma­nipula­t­ions of early en­vi­ron­men­tal con­di­tions had lit­tle qual­i­ta­tive im­pact on such pat­terns,” the re­search­ers wrote. Al­though the rea­sons for the dif­fer­ences are un­clear, the find­ings may be im­por­tant for fu­ture stud­ies of per­son­al­ity varia­t­ion and its ev­o­lu­tion­ary and ec­o­log­i­cal con­se­quenc­es, they added.

Re­search­ers seek to un­der­stand how an­i­mals de­vel­op dif­fer­ent “per­sonal­i­ties” in part be­cause they want to un­der­stand how hu­mans do so. An­i­mals are used as mod­el or­gan­isms be­cause they are of­ten sim­pler and eas­i­er to ex­pe­ri­ment on. For in­stance, an­i­mals may be bred dif­fer­ently to ex­am­ine re­sult­ing dif­fer­ences in be­hav­ior, and the early life en­vi­ron­ment of a test an­i­mal can be con­trolled and ex­am­ined.

Stud­ies have found that 20 to 50 per­cent of the varia­t­ion in an­i­mal per­son­al­ity traits is ge­net­ic, ac­cord­ing to re­search­ers with the Neth­er­lands In­sti­tute of Ecol­o­gy and the Max Planck In­sti­tute for Or­nith­ol­o­gy in Ger­ma­ny, who re­viewed the sub­ject for the De­cem­ber is­sue of the jour­nal Phil­o­soph­i­cal Trans­ac­tions of the Roy­al So­ci­e­ty B. 

“De­vel­op­ment and learn­ing” dom­i­nate the rest of this varia­t­ion, they added. But “one of the main ques­tions that still re­mains un­re­solved is why varia­t­ion in per­son­al­ity ex­ists and how this is main­tained… Mo­lec­u­lar ge­net­ic re­search on an­i­mal per­son­al­ity is still in its in­fan­cy.”

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