Everything Old Is New Again

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The Human Individual: Organism, Person, Meaner

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Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 610):

The human individual is at once a biological “individual”, a social “individual”, and a socio–semiotic “individual”:

as a biological “individual”, s/he is an organism, born into a biological population as a member of the human species.

as a social “individual”, s/he is a person, born into a social group as a member of society.  “Person” is a complex construct; it can be characterised as a constellation of social rôles or personæ entering into social networks …

as a socio–semiotic “individual”, s/he is a meaner, born into a meaning group as a member of a speech community.  Meaner is also a complex construct. …

These different levels of individuality map onto one other: a meaner is a person, and a person is a biological organism.  But the mappings are complex; and at each level an individual lives in different environments — in different networks of relations.

Academic Persona Types?

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Throughout this long deveopment, from 600 BC to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.  With this difference, others have been associated.  
The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically.  They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that ‘nobility’ or ‘heroism’ is to be preferred.  They have had a sympathy with irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.  
The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion.  
This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of we recognise as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

 — Bertrand Russell ‘The History Of Western Philosophy’ (pp21-2)

baby’s ontogenetic trajectory recorded

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here’s a TED talk about the recording of deb roy’s baby’s first 90,000 hours of interacting with parents and family. a true multimodal analysis of patterns of interaction qua language development.

… at least they label his activities (he’s from MIT) as “designing machines that learn to communicate in human like ways”

individual/community quotes

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4 thinkers, all men, who at different times have said almost the same things in different ways.

it’s not likely that V read any of the others, although L probably has. R&B, however, definitely did not read any of the other two. V’s was also in translation.
the meta-discursive meanings these guys were making then, were instances of different meaning “systems”, despite their being at another level instances of the same grammatical system, and dare i say, registers (this also despite the differences in orientation: the first uses a personal orientation (1st person), the second a third person orientation (it), and the third uses an inclusive ‘we’ orientation. at the same time, field may be considered similar due to repeated references to ‘individual’, and other lexical items in a sort of meronymic relation to ‘community’ [social, group]).

in view the differences in time of publication, and only one definite ‘cross-pollination’ of cultural (?) meanings, can we consider these quotation fragments as either ‘specimens’ (instruments) or ‘artefacts’ (objects) (in the halliday& matthiessen 2004 sense)? because they are not whole texts, and because they are not the subject of analysis at the grammatical level, perhaps – in this instance of their use – they should not be classed as specimens (of the language as system) – but artefacts…representative pieces of a larger puzzle? that larger puzzle, the way that meaning can be viewed, where it resides, how it comes about, how to think about meaning-making. and in this case, the mediating individual body is not viewed as the receptacle of meaning, rather the locus.

‘in this instance of their use’, the quotations are being used (by me) to highlight similarities in meta-meanings, through instances far removed in time and space. i’m always telling my students to only use quotations to illustrate or support their argument, not to make it for them. so, either i am not making an argument, or i am being hypocritical here and now.

Instead of talking about meaning-making as something that is done by minds, I prefer to talk about it as a social practice in a community. It is a kind of doing that is done in ways that are characteristic of a community, and its occurrence is part of what binds the community together and helps to constitute it as a community. In this sense we can speak of a community, not as a collection of interacting individuals, but as a system of interdependent social practices: a system of doings, rather than a system of doers. These social meaning-making practices are also material processes that bind the community together as a physical ecosystem.

[Lemke 1995: 9-10]

In point of fact, the speech act, or more accurately, its product-the utterance-cannot under any circumstances be considered an individual phenomenon in the precise meaning of the word and cannot be explained in terms of individual psychological or psychophysiological conditions of the speaker. The utterance is a social phenomenon.

[Volosinov 1973: 82]

At the group level, in addition to the verbal and non verbal processes,
present at the interpersonal level, we meet with new types of symbolization not ordinarily regarded as such. The patterns of the organization of the group leave traces in the participating individuals.
However, inasmuch as these individuals do not act as stations of origin or destination of messages, but often as channels only, codification at this level requires intactness in the organization as a whole. The group in action possesses the information, not the individual.

[Ruesch & Bateson 1951: 284]

Tiny bugs have own personalities despite being clones

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Ti­ny green in­sects known as pea aphids have in­di­vid­ual be­hav­ior pat­terns, or “per­sonal­i­ties,” de­spite be­ing clones of one an­oth­er, sci­en­tists say. The re­search­ers found dif­fer­ences in the way each in­di­vid­ual re­sponds to a threat.

The study was part of a “bur­geon­ing” of sci­en­tif­ic in­ter­est in an­i­mal per­son­al­ity varia­t­ion, not­ed the in­ves­ti­ga­tors, with the Uni­vers­ity of Os­nabrueck, Ger­ma­ny. But de­spite this trend, they added, few stud­ies have been done on in­ver­te­brates, or sim­ple an­i­mals with­out back­bones.

The pea aphid, Acyrthosiphon pi­sum, sucks nec­tar from a plant. (Im­age cour­tesy Tsu­to­mu Tsu­ch­ida)


Stud­ies on “clonal in­ver­te­brates,” which are all ge­net­ic­ally iden­ti­cal and would thus be ex­pected to show lim­it­ed dif­fer­ences in be­hav­ior, are “nonex­is­ten­t,” they added, re­port­ing their find­ings in the March 1 on­line is­sue of the jour­nal De­vel­op­men­tal Psy­cho­bi­ol­ogy.

“This is sur­pris­ing giv­en the ob­vi­ous ad­van­tages of us­ing in­ver­te­brates/clones to tack­le the cru­cial ques­tion why such con­sist­ent be­hav­ioral dif­fer­ences ex­ist,” they went on. Per­son­al­ity dif­fer­ences not at­trib­ut­a­ble to genes are gen­er­ally pre­sumed to be due to the en­vi­ron­ment in which an or­gan­ism formed, though there is al­so a grow­ing ap­precia­t­ion of epige­net­ic fac­tors—chem­ical dif­fer­ences that are not ge­net­ic, but that in­flu­ence gene ac­ti­vity.

Pea aphids, sci­entifically named Acyr­tho­si­phon pi­sum, are pale little in­sects ty­pi­cally less than a sixth of an inch (half a cen­ti­me­ter) long that feed on pea plants and their rel­a­tives. A clus­ter of aphids in­fest­ing a giv­en plant is typ­ic­ally a ge­net­ic­ally iden­ti­cal, or clonal, group pro­duced by one moth­er with­out sex, al­though aphids can al­so re­pro­duce sex­u­ally at cer­tain phases.

When a pea aphid is threat­ened by a preda­tor—of which the spe­cies has sev­er­al in­clud­ing wasps and grub­s—it gives off a chem­i­cal alarm sig­nal that alerts near­by aphids. They may re­spond in sev­er­al ways: they can walk away, drop off the plant or seem­ingly ig­nore the sig­nal. The re­search­ers, Wiebke Schuett and col­leagues, found that pea aphids can be di­vid­ed in­to one of three cat­e­gories: con­sist­ent “drop­pers,” con­sist­ent “non-droppers,” and some that be­have un­pre­dict­a­bly.

In ex­pe­ri­ments, “ma­nipula­t­ions of early en­vi­ron­men­tal con­di­tions had lit­tle qual­i­ta­tive im­pact on such pat­terns,” the re­search­ers wrote. Al­though the rea­sons for the dif­fer­ences are un­clear, the find­ings may be im­por­tant for fu­ture stud­ies of per­son­al­ity varia­t­ion and its ev­o­lu­tion­ary and ec­o­log­i­cal con­se­quenc­es, they added.

Re­search­ers seek to un­der­stand how an­i­mals de­vel­op dif­fer­ent “per­sonal­i­ties” in part be­cause they want to un­der­stand how hu­mans do so. An­i­mals are used as mod­el or­gan­isms be­cause they are of­ten sim­pler and eas­i­er to ex­pe­ri­ment on. For in­stance, an­i­mals may be bred dif­fer­ently to ex­am­ine re­sult­ing dif­fer­ences in be­hav­ior, and the early life en­vi­ron­ment of a test an­i­mal can be con­trolled and ex­am­ined.

Stud­ies have found that 20 to 50 per­cent of the varia­t­ion in an­i­mal per­son­al­ity traits is ge­net­ic, ac­cord­ing to re­search­ers with the Neth­er­lands In­sti­tute of Ecol­o­gy and the Max Planck In­sti­tute for Or­nith­ol­o­gy in Ger­ma­ny, who re­viewed the sub­ject for the De­cem­ber is­sue of the jour­nal Phil­o­soph­i­cal Trans­ac­tions of the Roy­al So­ci­e­ty B. 

“De­vel­op­ment and learn­ing” dom­i­nate the rest of this varia­t­ion, they added. But “one of the main ques­tions that still re­mains un­re­solved is why varia­t­ion in per­son­al­ity ex­ists and how this is main­tained… Mo­lec­u­lar ge­net­ic re­search on an­i­mal per­son­al­ity is still in its in­fan­cy.”

validity depends on belief

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The relation between information and value becomes still more evident when we consider the asking of questions and other forms of seeking information. We may compare the seeking of information with the seeking of values. In the seeking of values it is clear that what happens is that a man sets out to “trick” the Second Law of Thermodynamics. He endeavours to interfere with the “natural” or random course of events, so that some otherwise improbable outcome will be achieved. For his breakfast, he achieves and arrangement of bacon and eggs, side by side, upon a plate; and in achieving this improbability he is aided by other men who will sort out the appropriate pigs is some distant market and interfere with the natural juxtaposition of hens and eggs…[..]..Briefly, in value seeking he is achieving a coincidence or congruence between something in his head – an idea of what breakfast should be – and something external, an actual arrangement of eggs and bacon..[..]..In contrast, when he is seeking information, he is again trying to achieve a congruence between “something in his head” and the external world; but now he attempts to do this by altering what is in his head.

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