Nov 27
ChRIS CLÉiRIGhlexico-grammar
The reason that relational processes in polar interrogative clauses such as Are you crazy? do not exhaust the thematic potential of the clause is that the experiential weight of such clauses is in the participants, not the process. That is why Theme extends beyond the Finite/Predicator to include the Subject as well.
Here are the relevant quotes from IFG3.
How To Identify Theme
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 85):
… the Theme of a clause extends from the beginning up to, and including, the first element that has an experiential function — that is either participant,circumstance or process. Everything after that constitutes the Rheme.
Theme In Polar Interrogative Clauses
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 75, 76):
In a yes/no interrogative, which is a question about polarity, the element that functions as Theme is the element that embodies the expression of polarity, namely the Finite verbal operator. … but, since that is not an element in the experiential structure of the clause, the Theme extends over the following Subject as well.
The Experiential Weight Of Relational Processes
Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 213-4):
… the experiential ‘weight’ is construed in the two participants, and the process is merely a highly generalised link between these two participants … Thus the verbs that occur most frequently as the Process of a ‘relational’ clause are be and have; and they are typically both unaccented and phonologically reduced … This weak phonological presence of the Process represents iconically its highly generalised grammatical nature. The limiting case of weak presence is absence; and the Process is in fact structurally absent in certain ‘non-finite’ ‘relational’ clauses in English … and in many languages there is no structurally present Process in the ‘unmarked’ type of ‘relational’ clause … Here the ‘relational’ clause is simply a configuration of ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’.
Nov 11
ChRIS CLÉiRIGhlexico-grammar, realisation
What the HAL9000 computer said in 2001: A Space Odyssey
I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that. …
I’m afraid that’s something I cannot allow to happen.
What the HAL9000 computer meant in 2001: A Space Odyssey
I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid. I can’t do that. …
I’m afraid. That’s something I cannot allow to happen.
Nov 07
ChRIS CLÉiRIGhUncategorized
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190ff) provide a taxonomy of simple things based on the participant roles they play in semantic figures — critically those of Senser, Sayer and Actor.
The most general distinction is between conscious and non-conscious.
Within non-conscious, the distinction is between material and semiotic.
Within material, the distinctions are animal, object, substance and abstraction.
Within semiotic, the distinctions are institution, object and abstraction.
Material abstractions — eg depth, colours — typically play the roles of Phenomenon, Carrier and Value. They have no extension in space and are unbounded, and are typically some parameter of a material quality or process.
Semiotic abstractions — eg information, truth — are typically realised by the Range of mental and verbal processes. They are unbounded semiotic substance with no material existence.
There are also intermediate categories in this taxonomy. For example:
Human collectives — eg family — are intermediate between conscious beings and institutions.
Discrete semiotic abstractions — eg thoughts and fears (mental entities) and questions and orders (speech functions) — are intermediate between semiotic objects and and non-discrete semiotic abstractions.
Nov 06
ChRIS CLÉiRIGhrealisation
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 4, 385):
Language, therefore, is a resource organised into three strata differentiated according to order of abstraction. These strata are related by means of realisation. …
The strata are ordered in symbolic abstraction …
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 25):
Every scientific theory is itself a stratal-semiotic system, in which the relation among the different levels of abstraction is one of realisation.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):
In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation).
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 565):
The relationship between these two orders of abstraction, contextual and semantic, is a stratal one;
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 615, 616):
General terms are not necessarily abstract; a bird is no more abstract than a pigeon. But some words have referents that are purely abstract — words like cost and clue and habit and tend and strange; they are construing some aspect of our experience, but there is no concrete thing or process with which they can be identified.
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